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country elites do perceive the EU as embodying the norms central to its identity and, to some extent, see 
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The US will tell you straight away what its interests are, what they want exactly from you, even if 
you don't like it. The EU won't. It will talk to you about development and about trade and 
development, and the benefits, and about how much the EU wants to have a role in your country, 
but in the end it will have the same interests. There's a lot of rhetoric, I find, but it boils down to 
some very similar interests. Basically, the EU will invite you for lunch, and as they invite you, they 
threaten you, too. 
     -A former developing country trade negotiator 
 
1. Introduction  
External trade policy is the oldest and most integrated external policy area of the European Union. It 
seems self-evident that the study of external policy would place this area at the centre of attention, 
especially when the scholarship develops concepts designed to capture the nature of EU as actor on the 
world scene. Remarkably, this is not the case; the Normative Power Europe (NPEU) literature omits trade 
policy to a large extent.  
 
NPEU formulates an identity and role concept for the EU in world politics that gives rise to an observably 
distinct practice in world politics. According to Manners, a normative power defines the normal in world 
politics (Manners 2002; 2008). In effect, the normative power’s own norms are represented as “the 
normal”. Consequently, a normative power’s self-image includes a perception of itself as a power whose 
norms are universal. This paper takes as its point of departure the idea that the EU understands its own 
norms in the economic sphere as universal. 
 
However, because identity is relational, such a self-image relies critically on the perception that other 
actors have of the political entity known as the “European Union”, its discourse and practice. The impact 
of normative power can only exist where third parties perceive a power’s norms as “normal”, as desirable 
and attractive for emulation. For that reason, rather than inquiring directly into whether or not the NPEU 
prism accurately describes the EU’s identity and its practice in commercial negotiations, we ask whether 
the EU’s interlocutors perceive the EU as being and acting as a Normative Power. We thereby center 
attention on the relational aspect of the EU’s identity, holding that EU rhetoric does not suffice to 
establish it as a normative power unless others confirm its self-image as such. Most importantly, the 
perceptions of others raise questions as to whether the EU’s practice in trade negotiations is distinct from 
that of other players, as the NPEU literature suggests it will be for external policy in general.  
 
While the NPEU concept has often been applied in the study of EU external policy, economic and trade 
policies have often been omitted from consideration. Some implicit consensus suggests that the concept 
does not apply and that, in trade policy, EC merely defends its commercial interests (Smith 2003). Some 
exceptions exist, such as van den Hove’s study (2006) on EU as normative power in the Doha 
Development Round. A more general exception are the studies on development policy and NPEU. 
 
We believe multilateral trade negotiations are ripe for analysis under the NPEU prism. In recent decades, 
the multilateral regime has slowly morphed from an arena for negotiations on technical issues into one 
that is much more normatively thick. In tandem, the rhetoric the EU has deployed in the context of trade 
negotiations is increasingly normative, emphasizing the impact of trade on development, poverty 
alleviation and environmental sustainability in poor countries. Secondly, because trade policy is the oldest 
of the EU’s community competences, dating back a half a century to the treaty of Rome and creating a 
stable and lengthy history of ongoing commercial negotiations between the EU and its partners. And 
finally, because trade diplomacy itself has changed in the last three decades, shifting its focus from 
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traditional barriers to trade (e.g., import tariffs and quotas) to regulatory, behind-the border issues, leading 
to the inclusion of sensitive issues such as essential medicines, emergency food aid, core labour and 
environmental standards and the protection of indigenous knowledge into the negotiating agenda. In each 
case, different models exist on the “normal” relationship between market and society. The European 
model is only one among many. 
 
So, we assume that norms do matter in contemporary trade negotiations. To assess the impact of EU 
norms, it is important to establish what norms third party (non-EU) state elites consider characteristic for 
the EU and what norms they believe guide the EU’s practice in trade negotiations. Such an assessment 
allows us to examine whether the norms constitutive of the EU’s identity, are confirmed by third parties.  
Still,  studies of third actors’ perceptions of the EU are thin on the ground  (Lucarelli 2007). Elgstrom 
(2007) studied the role of the EU as perceived by third parties in WTO negotiations.  
 
This paper, in contrast, seeks to address this gap in the literature by testing the normative power concept 
in the context of multilateral trade negotiations from the perspective of others. Third party elites’ 
perceptions and experience were tested through a series of semi-structure interviews with current and 
former trade negotiators conducted in Geneva at the end of May 2008. 
 
2. Normative power 
The EU is an established, if atypical, actor in world politics. Although they do not always succeed, the 27 
member states are formally committed to speak with one voice in international affair, including trade. 
Occasionally, coordination remains problematic as shown by the recent, high profile fall-out between EU 
trade commissioner Mandelson and the French president. Notwithstanding the complex pattern of 
cooperation and disunity in external action, academics and policy-makers have sought out a more precise 
understanding of what type of actor the EU is. In a seminal article, Manners (2002) suggested that the EU 
is a distinct type of actor: one whose practice is both norm-driven and defines the “normal” in world 
politics. Other scholars have persistently questioned the EU’s distinctiveness in terms of practice and 
argued that the EU is as interest-driven as any other actor in world politics [hyde price; youngs]. Before 
we can elaborate on this, we present our understanding of NPEU. 
 
A first precondition for normative power is a concentration of power in a political entity of the 
international system1. Hence, there are material conditions for a normative power. How these conditions 
are interpreted by the relevant agents and what options and constraints for practice they entail will vary 
between political entities. The dominant identity and role conception in a political entity bestow meaning 
on these material conditions and inform the relevant agents on appropriate practice. This paper is 
epistemologically grounded in critical realism: the world of “brute facts” makes up the material 
conditions that underlie the exercise of normative power. In the realm of trade negotiations, the sheer size 
of the EU market and its citizens’ purchasing power represents the “brute fact” that lends material weight 
to European trade negotiators’ positions in the context of multilateral negotiations. However, such brute 
facts acquire meaning only through the play of interpretations rendered possible by intesubjectivity, seen 
as the realm of shared meanings, values and rules.  Normative power as identity is attributed to this 
intersubjective realm. 
                                                     
1
 Manners underscores that normative power frees the discussion from the Westphalian connotation which are 
common to the concepts of civilian and great power [ref]. In this paper, we do not so much brush over the 
Westphalian myopia, but propose “political entity” in the international system [cf. Buzan & Little 2000]. A political 
entity can be a state, the European Union, an empire. 
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An essential characteristic of NPEU is the ability to “shape conceptions of the normal” in world politics 
(Manners 2002, 239). It is understood that EU norms define the appropriate practices and objectives in 
world politics in general, not just for itself. These EU norms are discursively constructed as “universal” 
(Diez 2005, ; Merlingen 2007, ; Pace 2007). “Universal” norms are expected to attract imitation by actors 
outside the EU.  
 
As a Normative Power, the EU is expected to do more than simply embody its norms in the conduct of 
internal affairs, it is also expected to conduct external relations in accordance with its stated universal 
norms. Norm-adherence is expected to give rise to an observably distinct form of behaviour in world 
politics: the EU on the world scene is expected to act differently in comparison to other actors (Adler and 
Crawford 2004, ; Diez and Manners 2007, 176-178; Manners 2002, ; Manners and Whitman 2003). In 
short, NPEU proposes an ideal-typical identity and role conception for the study of the EU as external 
actor. The ideal-type is defined by three characteristics: (1) NPEU defines the normal in world politics 
through norm diffusion (appropriate practice); (2) the EU’s practice is norm-driven as opposed to interest-
driven; and, (3) the European norms are universal. 
 
This image of the EU as normative power is found both in academic and in official discourse (Diez 2005, 
; Merlingen 2007, ; Pace 2007). NPEU is more than simply a scholarly category for the study of the EU 
as an external actor; an influential section of the EU´s political and academic elite generates this identity 
in its practice (cit. in: Diez 2005, 614; Diez and Manners 2007, 174). The identity “ ... tell[s] you and 
others who you are and tell[s] you who others are” (Hopf 1998, 175). According to the literature, NPEU 
generates a set of images, values and norms that enable the EU to set itself apart from other actors in 
world politics: the EU specific norms. They include the norm that the EU “… attempts to change others 
through the spread of particular norms”(cit. in: Diez 2005, 614; Diez and Manners 2007, 174). This norm 
for appropriate practice elaborates how the EU defines the normal: it spreads its norms in world politics.  
 
Norm diffusion may be passive or active. Passive norm diffusion occurs when third parties choose to 
imitate the EU´s model. Active norm diffusion refers to EU´s purposive attempts to project its norms in 
world politics, including through participation in international organizations. When the EU seeks to 
spread its norms through the WTO system and negotiations, we have a case of active norm diffusion.  
 
At this point, a detour outside the NPEU literature serves to elaborate the way a conceptualisation of 
normative power as identity comes to hinge critically on recognition by other actors in world politics. 
Identity is relational. That is, “European” norms exist by implicit contrast to “non-European norms” and 
the European Self to a non-European Other. Without these differences the EU Self disappears (Nayak 
2006, 45). Identity depends on creating a boundary between the Self and the Other, on the distinction 
between European and the non-European, such that identity-creation is, by necessity, an exclusionary 
practice. This type of boundary creation is “an active and ongoing part of identity formation” (Neumann 
1996, 166).  
 
Several academic contributions to the NPEU debate illustrate this boundary drawing exercise in practice. 
The favourite Other in the literature is the United States (Adler and Crawford 2004, ; Lightfoot and 
Burchell 2005, ; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007, ; Smith 2003) which is often cast in a realist or semi-realist 
role. The US is then assumed to act with a view to relative gains, while the EU defines itself as a 
promoter of universal norms (idem, also: Manners 2002, 236).  
 
While the Other delineates the Self, the Self also depends on recognition by others. Identity is not only 
subjective (the EU’s self-image as elite construction), but has an intersubjective (relational) dimension 
(Wendt 1999, 224). It is this intersubjective aspect that, according to Wendt, provides “truth conditions” 
for identity claims (1999, 177). According to the NPEU scholarship, these are the EU’s norms and its 
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norm diffusion role. But because norms can only be defused if others choose to incorporate them, NPEU 
self-image actually depends on the acceptance of the EU’s self-image by others. Therefore, consistency 
between the norms presented as European and the EU’s external practice can confirm the European elite’s 
claims to normative power, just as inconsistency can problematize them (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002, 
769, 771-774) (Diez 2005, ; Pace 2007, 1056-1057).  
 
Much, in this regard, hinges on the recursive interpretation of self- and other-perceptions: the EU’s self-
image and the interpretation of the EU’s Self by third actors, need not correspond with each other. What 
the EU considers in line with its norms can be interpreted as norm-violations by the Other. And what the 
EU takes as confirmation of its self-image may not have been intended as such by the Other. 
 
Existing research on the outsider’s perspective points to the problems with consistency between practice 
and self-image (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008, ; Chaban et al. 2006, ; Elgstrom 2007a, ; 2007b, ; 
Lucarelli 2007). This paper explicitly looks into the perceptions of the representative of third party states, 
specifically trade negotiators, former trade negotiators and trade negotiations specialists from outside the 
EU. Do such practitioners recognise the EU’s Self-image as developed in the NPEU literature?  
 
The next table summarizes the different steps in identifying a normative power. The main emphasis on 
this paper is on the relational aspect (e). It follows that we accept that the conditions from (a) to (d) 
fulfilled. In economic and trade terms in particular, EU is a power in the international economy. Its elites 
are well aware of these capabilities and the EU rhetoric confirms that the EU norms are considered 
universable. One question remains: what are the EU norms? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Table * . Steps in identifying a normative power (Zutter, forthcoming) 
 
Material condition  
(a) concentration of power in international system. 
 
The self-image and role-conception 
(b) awareness of these capacities by the political entity itself and its elites 
(c) its own (particularist) norms are constructed as universal or universable;  
(d) it is an appropriate practice to project these norms in world politics  
 
The relational aspect 
(e) do others recognise the Self-image as the identity of the political entity? 
 
Assessment of the normative power’s impact 
(f) the impact of its norms on other political entities or civil societies beyond its boundaries. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
To evaluate the recognition of the EU’s self-image by others, we need first to determine the most relevant 
EU norms. What are the EU’s core norms according to the NPEU literature?  
 
A first issue is: where do the European norms emanate from? The origins are traced back to Europe’s 
historical experience. Several aspects appear in the literature. Among them are the common experience of 
war and class struggle. (Lucarelli 2006, 5-6; Manners 2002, 241; Therborn 2001). Other elements involve 
the particular evolution of the EU as a hybrid polity and its unique constitutional configuration (Manners 
2002, ; Manners and Whitman 2003). The roots of EU identity are historically contingent and evolve over 
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time. Hence, the norms that guide the EU’s international conduct stand in dynamic relation to the on-
going identity formation practices of the EU (Lucarelli 2006, 1-2, 6; Manners 2002, 241-243).  
 
It would seem straightforward that – within a specific time period – an unambiguous, bounded set of 
norms must constitute the European Self (Manners 2002, ; 2006a). Still, as is to be expected, different 
scholars elaborate lists with varying points of emphasis. Manners´ seminal article listed peace, social 
liberty, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, 
social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2002, ; 2006a, 32-38; Manners 
2008, 47-53). Other lists added overlapping and additional norms such as (liberal) democracy, democratic 
peace, rule of law, and order and justice (Manners 2008, 48-56; Nicolaidis and Howse 2002, 1045; Pace 
2007, ; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007, 441-442, 447-449). Manners and Whiteman (2003, 398-400) 
include pacifism, consensus-orientation and a contra-Westphalian order in the international identity of the 
EU. For this paper, we rely on Manners’ selection of EU norms [2002, ..., 2008] and complement these 
with norms on the economic organisation of society. The 2002 table sets out the normative foundation of 
the EU, which distinguishes the European Self from the non-European Other. Still, as noticed before, 
some norms are characteristic of other actors in world politics, such as the USA 
 
Founding 
Principles 
Task and objectives Stable 
institutions 
Fundamental 
Rights 
Liberty  Social solidarity Guarantee of 
democracy 
Dignity 
Democracy Anti-discrimination Rule of law Freedoms 
Respect for 
human rights 
and fundamental 
freedoms 
Sustainable 
development 
Human rights Equality 
 
Solidarity 
Rule of law  Protection of 
minorities 
Citizenship 
 
Justice 
Treaty base - 
set out in art. 
6 of the TEU 
Treaty base - set 
out in arts. 2 of 
TEC and TEU, arts 6 
and 13 of TEC 
Copenhagen 
criteria -  set 
out in the 
conclusions of 
the June 1993 
European Council 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights of the 
European Union 
Source: Manners (2002) 
 
Whereas the 2002 table omitted the market economy, Manners included the five freedoms and “freer 
trade and market access ... promoted through trade liberalization agreements” in a more recent 
formulation (2008, 49). The market economy is hegemonic idea in the contemporary world, but can be 
interpreted in very different ways. As Susan Strange wrote, the European form of capitalism builds on “a 
sounder foundation of social acceptability … [in which] economic transfers and guarantees of social 
security system can be defended as a politically necessary insurance against discontent and social 
instability” (cit. in: Manners 2006a, 21). Notwithstanding variations between European capitalisms 
(Giddens 2007, 9-11; van Apeldoorn 2002, 71-82), social solidarity and (more recently) sustainable 
development are the “non-economic” norms which give rise the EU specific market-economy (Manners 
2008, 53-54). 
 
The importance of the market-economy to the EU Self is reflected in official documents. The Copenhagen 
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European Council Conclusions complemented democracy, human rights, minority rights and 
implementation of the Community acquis with a direct vindication of market economy.(EU 1993, 13) 
More to the point, it demanded “the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” (EU 1993, 13). These conditions for 
Membership of the EU were subsequently included in the treaties (TEU, art. 49). It follows that the 
market economy criterion establishes a norm by which the EU identifies itself and which guides EU 
practice in internal and external policy.  This norm must be interpreted in conjunction with the 
aforementioned “non-economic” norms. A whole series of policies - competition policy, state aid 
regulations, consumer protection, economic and social cohesion with the structural fund and trans-
European Networks – underline the complexity of the evolving EU market economy, as emphasized by 
the literature on “regulatory capitalism” [van den Hove (2006) Levi-Faur and Jordana (2005); Jessop (see 
also: Clark 1999, Ch. 5; 2002)] 
 
The Lisbon process is the contemporary instantiation of the EU approach to the market economy:  its 
emphasis on knowledge, innovation and competitiveness involves a reorganisation of the state as carer for 
its citizens into a “enabling” state: through education, training and a beneficial regulatory climate, citizens 
are activated in the economy (Jessop 2002, Ch. 2). It is important to underline that goal of the Lisbon 
strategy is “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Council 
of the European Union 2000, para. 5), whilst “preserving the European social model” (Council of the 
European Union 2005, para 22). As a recent instantiation of EU’s form of regulatory capitalism, the 
Lisbon process shows the market economy norm as dynamic and evolving element of EU identity. 
 
It should be noted that the Lisbon process has an internal as well as external agenda, and specific 
implications for the EU’s stance in WTO and other trade negotiations [global Europe].  
 
The clearest and most formalized statements of EU identity can be found in the European treaties. 
According to the Treaty on the European Union, the Union aims “to assert its identity on the international 
scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy ... ” (TEU, art. 
2). The treaty sets out the objectives for this common foreign and security policy as multilateralism with 
respect for international law, international cooperation and the goal to “develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, art. 11). 
Specific reference to trade policy in conjunction with the market economy norm can be found in the TEC, 
which sets out the EC’s aims in its trade policy as the “progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade and the lowering of customs barriers” (art. 131, TEC).  
 
The balance to be struck between economic and non-economic norms and the dense regulation of the 
market is less straightforward in the text on external trade policy. Two problems arise: the market 
economy norm is not qualified by non-economic norms and the coherence in EU’s external policy is not 
laid down in the existing treaties. The latter is partially solved in the Treaty on the European Union as 
revised by the Lisbon treaty (Council of the European Union 2008, 1-60. Henceforth: TEU rev.) which 
seeks coherence in the EU’s external action. The TEU rev. enshrines normative coherence in external 
action, but it omits external trade policy. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Council 
of the European Union 2008, 61-260. Henceforth: TFEU) regulates the external commercial policy and 
links it to the norms and objectives of the EU’s external action in general (TFEU, art. 205). Moreover, the 
revisions give a more comprehensive set of norms which guide the external action (TEU rev., art. 21,  1): 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, solidarity (TEU rev., art. 21, 1); rule of (international) law (TEU 
rev., art. 21, 2 b & c), democracy (TEU rev., art. 21, 2 b); sustainable development (TEU rev., art. 21, 2 d 
& f). While the former appeared in Manners’ 2002 table, other norms are also included: market economy 
(TEU rev., art. 21, 2e) and “the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty” (TEU rev., art. 21, 2d). 
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On the basis of these official documents, it is possible to develop a taxonomy of EU norms. In the 
research, a subset of norms are selected which reflect the EU approach to the market-economy. The 
norms constitute the EU identity and are relevant for its self-image, including its external practice, in the 
economic sphere. Yet, the norms do not belong to a single sphere (cf. Manners in Lucarelli & Manners) 
because they exist within a dynamic interplay non-economic norms. The EU specific approach of 
regulatory capitalism explains the inclusion of norms from other spheres. As we focus on commercial 
negotiations, norms which are relevant to the broader context of international cooperation, are included. 
 
Sphere Norm 
Political Democracy, rule of law, multilateralism, fundamental freedoms, human rights and  
peace 
Economic Market economy, regulatory capitalism, competition 
Social 
 
*ecological 
Solidarity, poverty reduction/economic development and sustainable development* 
 
 
The image of the EU as a normative power cannot be limited to an arbitrarily delineated realm of external 
action (security policy, for instance), but instead should cover all different spheres (Pace 2007, 1043). 
Undue delineation [Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007, 437); Keohane (2002)] would ignore the relational 
character of identity, since third actors do not necessarily differentiate between the different aspect of the 
EU’s external practice. The perceptions of the EU as actor in world politics in general may affect the 
image of the EU in trade policy and vice-versa. Therefore, the general image on the EU, the perceptions 
on the EU as norm diffuser and as actor in the WTO are to be compared. Our research strategy aims to 
incorporate these insights into our questionnaire design.  
 
Since a normative power considers its own, particularistic, norms universal, we have traced and set out 
the EU norms on the organisation of the economy and international cooperation. Although these norms 
are part of the EU’s self-image, there is no reason to simply assume that third actors recognise them as 
constitutive of the EU’s identity. This is the first aspect to be assessed. Second, the NPEU literature 
assumes that it is an appropriate practice for the EU to project these into world politics. Again, the 
question arises whether third actors perceive the EU’s norms as attractive and worthy of imitation. Third, 
we must question whether the norms guide the EU’s external action in practice in a given field of external 
action, and whether other actors’ state elites recognize the weight of norms in guiding EU action. To put 
the last question into sharper perspective, and mindful of the long tradition of defining the EU by 
reference to the US, we enquire also whether the EU’s practice in the WTO is perceived as significantly 
different, less coercive and more norm-bound as that of the USA.  
 
We reject the view that a normative power adopts specific strategies and instruments in the practice of 
world politics  (Johansson-Nogués 2007, 188-191; Sjursen 2006, 241-242; Tocci 2007), instead treating a 
wide array of strategies and instruments as compatible with the exercise of state power (Diez 2005, 616; 
Diez and Manners 2007, ; Hyde-Price 2006, ; Manners 2002, ; Youngs 2004) . Nonetheless, in the 
comparison of perceptions of the EU and USA, instruments and strategies were included because several 
authors sought to distinguish these two actors in world politics in these terms [e.g. scheipers & sicurelli].  
 
These considerations lead to the following format of the questionnaires.  
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3. Traditional approaches to EU trade policy 
Traditional accounts of EU trade policy making have relatively little to say about EU identity or its nature 
as an actor in world politics. Much of the literature is preoccupied with institutional dynamics, 
particularly the factors underpinning delegation of authority over trade policy from the national to the 
community level (Nicolaïdis and Meunier 1999; Meunier 2005; Woolcock 2005). 
 
Its central concern has been the so-called puzzle of liberalization: why have relatively protectionist 
principals (National Governments) chosen to delegate authority over trade policy making to a largely 
protectionist Agent (the European Commission)? How much autonomy has the agent acquired, and what 
mechanisms have evolved to ensure principals' ongoing control over the agent?  
 
This literature is concerned with formal aspects of governance: its central object is the relationship 
between the structure of European institutions and the EU's negotiating capacity, flexibility, effectiveness 
and/or authority. Much of it centres on a debate about what Dur (2006) describes as the "collusive 
delegation argument": the idea that politicians consciously designed the EU's institutional framework to 
insulate trade policy making from the influence of protectionist lobbying.  
 
The collusive delegation argument amounts to the application, to the EU context, of a family of 
arguments developed within American political economy (Destler 1986) to address the puzzle of 
liberalization. In this view, politicians ideologically committed to the cause of Free Trade would realize 
that they are unable to deliver it in the face of organized protectionist pressures, and therefore delegate 
their authority as an exercise in blame-shifting, or "bureaucratic shirking". In the United States, 
delegation takes the form of congressional representatives handing trade policy making authority to the 
executive. In the European version, national governments delegate authority to the European Commission 
(Dur, 2006). 
 
Lifted nearly whole from an American political science tradition, the collusive delegation argument 
Spheres Norms Image of EU EU’s external practice EU – USA  
in WTO 
EU  
in WTO 
Political Democracy X X   
 Rule of law X X X X 
 Multilateralism  X X X 
 Fundamental freedoms & human rights X X   
 Peace project X    
Economic Peace through economic integration X    
 Market economy X X  X 
 Regulation (regulatory capitalism) X   X 
 Competition on the market X   X 
Social Solidarity X X X X 
 Poverty reduction (economic development) X X  (in developing countries) X X 
 Sustainable development X X X X 
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assumes away the problem of characterizing the nature of EU power. It is therefore singularly ill-suited to 
providing insights into the role of norms and role conceptions in the formulation of trade policies, much 
less their perception by outsiders. Centred on the dynamic interactions of interest groups mobilized to 
obtain commercial advantage, it is in some ways blind to the thickening normative content of 
contemporary trade diplomacy, where technical debates over tariff structures and counterveiling duty 
trigger points are increasingly coupled with morally charged interactions over lifesaving medicines and 
the livelihood security of the world’s poor.   
 
4. Empirics  
To test third countries’ perceptions of EU norms, we conducted 17 semi-structured interviews with 
Geneva-based trade negotiators and former negotiators from twelve separate countries (Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Brazil, Egypt, India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines and 
Venezuela). All subjects had personal experience of negotiating directly with EU trade negotiators. In all 
but two cases interviews were conducted in person, including 39 questions and typically lasting an hour.  
 
An initial set of 11 closed questions inquired into subjects’ perceptions of the EU’s identity. Eleven 
norms usually described as constitutive of the EU were presented, and subjects were asked to what extent 
they considered the norm constitutive of EU identity. Responses were placed on a 5-point attitudinal scale 
(ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Subjects that identified a given norm as constitutive of 
EU identity were then asked whether they perceived that norm as relevant and attractive for emulation for 
their country and its region. A four point attitudinal scale was developed (ranging from the norm is “a 
model for my country and its region” to the norm “applies only to the EU.”) Both sets of replies were then 
normalized on a percentage scale (full agreement = 100%). The results are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents largely reflected the EU’s identity self-perception, with the Europe’s historical peace project 
perceived as the strongest constituent of EU identity and norms relating to sustainable development and 
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income redistribution between and among states less strongly associated with EU identity. Interestingly, 
no correlation is evident between a norm’s perceived centrality to European identity and its attractiveness 
as a model for emulation. The density of rules and regulations within the EU internal market standing out 
as a feature strongly associated with EU identity but is not widely perceived as a model for emulation. 
Alternatively, the EU’s approach to sustainable development is seen as a highly attractive target for 
emulation, but not as a key component of EU identity.   
 
When our survey turns from questions relating to the EU’s identity to questions about its role in world 
politics, respondents’ appreciation of the EU as a normative power become more problematic. 
 
 
 
 
The strongest consensus surrounds the EU’s actions to aid the spread of the market economy, followed by 
a series of abstract norms such as Human Rights, International Law and the Spread of Democracy. 
Agreement is weaker on actions likely to be of direct economic benefit developing countries. Each of the 
statements still garners more approval than disapproval (average answer > 3) yet the very high scores 
obtained in the first set of questions are not replicated. 
 
The questionnaire moves from the abstract to the concrete, with the next set of questions concerning the 
EU’s specific practice in the context of multilateral trade negotiations. As we move into territory our 
respondents have direct experience with, we find the willingness to describe the EU’s practice as norm-
driven diminishes.  
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While the average response remains above the 3 mark (agreement outranks disagreement) only the 
contention that the EU emphasises further elaboration of rules in the WTO context enjoyed truly strong 
support. The EU’s penchant for WTO rule-making, however, was more often seen as driven by a desire to 
score commercial gains for EU producers than by a will to spread its own norms: 
 
 
 
Overall, while few respondents were prepared to attribute EU trade policy stances entirely to 
mercantilistic impulses, a clear majority perceived economic interests as being the preponderant factor in 
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EU trade negotiating positions. 
 
 
 
There is, to be sure, some scepticism about the EU’s self-image as a normative power among its WTO 
negotiating partners. Interestingly, distinctive practice is only observed in the use of instruments which 
does not confirm the EU´s Normative Power identity. When contrasted with the negotiating practices of 
the United States, in particular, the EU is perceived as acting more cooperatively and less coercively: 
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So the US is perceived as being somewhat more focused on its narrow commercial interest and more 
willing to use coercive tactics in negotiations than the EU, while the EU is seen as slightly more willing 
to compromise, and more interested in reducing poverty in developing countries and in balancing 
globalization to avoid negative outcomes for poor countries. The differences are easy to overstate, 
however: across all of these comparative questions, respondents answered “both are about the same” or 
“neither” 47% of the time. 
 
Several respondents described the difference between the way the EU and the US practice negotiations as 
largely stylistic, with “brash” Americans happy to put their demands bluntly and directly to their 
negotiating partners, while more “polished” Europeans made a greater effort to show (or feign) concern 
before pressing quite similar concerns. Preference for one approach or the other appeared to depend on 
negotiator’s personalities -  also a factor stressed in responses – with some “no-nonsense” negotiators 
actually preferring the American way of negotiating as “more straightforward” to the somewhat 
mystifying European approach.  
 
What is perhaps most interesting is that respondents did not, by and large, perceive a contradiction 
between their identification of EU constitutive norms and the European Commission’s weak adherence to 
those same norms in the conduct of multilateral negotiations. Again and again, our interviewees granted 
that the outsized importance of narrow commercial interests was simply a feature of trade negotiations, 
“the way the game is played”. This widely shared, tacit understanding of what is appropriate in the 
conduct of negotiations precluded, in many cases, the judgment that the EU’s practice of trade 
negotiations is in some way at odds with its self-image. Within the negotiators’ ethic that prevails in 
Geneva, the abandonment of high principles and developmentalist rhetoric once negotiators find 
themselves behind closed door does not raise eye-brows. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Our exploratory research suggests a particular set of interactions and tensions between the constitutive 
elements of the Normative Power ideal-type. We recall that a normative power (1) defines the normal in 
world politics through norm diffusion (appropriate practice); (2) is norm-driven as opposed to interest-
driven; and, (3) treats its own norms are universal. According to the NPEU literature, this gives rise to an 
observably distinct practice in world politics. Rather than studying the EU’s self-image in terms of 
Normative Power, this paper emphasized the relational aspect of the EU’s identity. It takes external policy 
as the whole of EU’s practice on the world scene and therefore sought to assess the EU as Normative 
Power on three levels: the perception of EU norms and their universality; norm-driven practice in world 
politics; and, norm-driven practice in WTO negotiations. For the latter, the EU’s practice is compared to 
its “favourite Other”, the US. 
 
We find that non-EU state elites recognize the EU norms from the economic, political and social spheres, 
relevant for commercial negotiations, as characteristic of the EU, with particularly high agreement on the 
regulatory capitalism norm. The EU norms are to a certain extent considered a model for non-EU 
countries and thus accepted as universal and able to be adapted to local circumstances.  
 
However, while the EU is reasonably successful at defining the normal through passive diffusion – 
because its constitutive norms are both recognized and, in many cases, perceived to be attractive to 
imitation – its attempts at active norm-diffusion are not widely regarded as themselves norm-driven. 
Hence, there is only limited support for the thesis that the EU´s practice is in line with the Normative 
Power concept. In world politics in general, the market economy is again the norm that the EU is keenest 
on promoting, according to the interviewees. Some other norms, like human rights and international law, 
are also seen as characteristic for the EU’s external policy, but other norms which the EU discursively 
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presents as its own, are less strongly identified with its external action. Here, there is a first discripancy 
between self-image and perception by others becomes clear.  
 
In the context of WTO negotiations, this discripancy is more keenly felt: Europe’s interlocutors tend to 
assume that attempts at European norm diffusion are, if not solely, certainly largely interest driven. They 
do not perceive this as illegitimate, given the norms of appropriateness constituting world trade 
negotiations. An important conclusion in terms of the NPEU literature is that the EU norms do not give 
rise to a distinct practice in trade policy in specific. The EU is a player like all others and its practice is 
inline with the dominant practice in commercial negotiations. The logic of appropriateness discernable in 
WTO negotiations allows for each participants to seek to realise economic gains for its own key internal 
constituencies, and this logic appears to dominate the expectation of norm-driven action from the EU in 
this setting.  
 
Such an interpretation supports Smith’s argument (2003)  that a reversed use of the high an low politics 
divide appears in external trade policy: the EU is seen as soft/normative in high politics and hard/realist in 
low politics. Yet only comparison with EU’s practice in “high politics” can establish this. 
 
Judged in contrast to the main alternative world trade power and favourite Other US, EU negotiating 
practices are indeed perceived as less narrowly focused on relative gains or gaining narrowly conceived 
commercial advantages. Indeed, our interviewees by and large do not perceive EU negotiating stances at 
the WTO as solely interest-driven. They do, however, conceive them as mostly interest driven. 
 
Our research suggests several new avenues for NPEU researchers. To what extent can NPEU continue to 
serve as an identity-defining concept for EU academic and political elites when its practice of external 
affairs is not seen as fundamentally norm-led or as substantially distinct from that of the US? Can a power 
“define the normal in world politics” through passive norm difusion only? And, finally, do state elites 
engaging with the EU in other fora share the perception of the EU prevalent among WTO negotiators? 
Each of these questions strikes us as ripe for further research.  
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